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Definitive solutions for war-torn Syria, Iraq and Libya are still on a 
distant horizon, but the scale and intensity of violence seem to be 
ebbing in 2018. With the forceful reclamation of Mosul, Aleppo and 
Raqqa, as well as the repossession of Sirte and the end of fighting 
in Benghazi, the greatest battles appear to be over. The civil war in 
Syria is increasingly localised into pockets of conflict in the South 
and the North, which are not likely to change the overall course of 
events. Iraqi central government and the Syrian regime have gained 
the upper hand in the last two years thanks to undeniable economic 
and military support from regional and international allies. ISIS, as 
a territorialised terrorist organisation, has almost been completely 
wiped out in all three war-torn countries, even though its activities are 
bound to persist. The military situation in Libya has been relatively 
stagnant since late 2015, with the exception of localised conflicts. 
1.  This policy brief is intended as a first output of a new MEDirections 
research axis, and will result in a series of publications and events in the 
coming months.
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Overall, the military situation is best described as a 
stalemate, resulting from a balance of weakness  between 
various parties. 
The ongoing wars in the region have inflicted heavy 
damage on these countries’ populations, economies and 
physical infrastructure. Syria is the most dramatic of all 
war-torn countries. The World Bank in 20172 estimated 
that Syria had lost one third of the housing stock and 
around half of its medical and education facilities. It 
is also estimated as of mid-2016 that 400 thousand 
people had lost their lives in the ongoing conflict, with 
11.6 million displaced inside or outside the country in 
December 20173 
The situation in Iraq has not been less dramatic, even 
though the misery of war was rather concentrated in the 
North-Western corner of the country. Around 3 million 
people were displaced and most major cities in the area 
were destroyed, including Iraq’s second biggest city Mosul. 
The Iraqi Minister of Planning put the most recent figure 
for reconstruction at 88.2 billion dollars4. This comes 
at a time when Iraqi infrastructure had already been in 
shambles due to the protracted civil strife since 2003, and 
before that, a decade of UN sanctions that followed yet 
another decade of war with Iran (1980-1988). 
In Libya, where conflict is comparatively of lower intensity, 
displacement and infrastructure destruction as well as 
interruptions in economic activities and job loss have all 
taken their toll on the population. These are exacerbated 
by the poor conditions found in infrastructure, which was 
already the case under Gaddafi, and the utter dependence 
on oil for the generation of growth and state revenue, 
with little – if any – links  with the domestic economy. To 
2.  The Visible Impacts of the Syrian War May Only be the 
Tip of the Iceberg, The World Bank Group, Press release, 
10 July 2017. Available at: http://www.worldbank.org/en/
news/press-release/2017/07/18/the-visible-impacts-of-the-
syrian-war-may-only-be-the-tip-of-the-iceberg
3.  Returnees in Syria - Sustainable reintegration and 
durable solutions, or a return to displacement?, Thematic 
series The Invisible Majority, Internal Displacement 
Monitoring Centre (IDMC), November 2017. Available 
at: http://www.internal-displacement.org/assets/
publications/2017/20171130-idmc-syria-case-study.pdf
4.  Taklefat iadat i’mar al-iraq tatagawaz 88 miliar dolar (The 
cost of reconstructing Iraq exceeds 88 billion dollars), BBC 
Arabic, 12 February 2018. Available in Arabic at  http://
www.bbc.com/arabic/middleeast-43030459 
add insult to injury, state collapse had further diminished 
official institutions’ capacity to regulate (or prevent illicit) 
economic activities ranging from fiddling the fixed 
exchange rate to human trafficking and arms smuggling. 
Some may think that serious talk of reconstruction is not 
possible unless civil wars are brought to an end by some 
political settlement or by one party’s crushing victory over 
the others. Indeed, reconstruction is much more than 
just the physical rebuilding of what was destroyed. It is 
a political-economic process that has clear distributional 
dynamics and implications. It is likely to reflect the 
balance of power on the ground, coalitions of beneficiaries 
(and losers) and may hence contribute to stability or 
reconciliation, or conversely create new grievances and 
bases for contention. How exactly reconstruction will be 
carried out, politically, institutionally and economically, 
is an integral part of any serious long-term thought and 
effort for post-war stabilisation. Otherwise, there is a risk 
of establishing conditions for protracted conflict that may 
continue for decades along regional, ethnic and sectarian 
lines. It may hence be a good exercise to start identifying 
actors to pay for the reconstruction and consider how it 
will be organised.
There is seemingly a twofold challenge for potential 
reconstruction efforts at this juncture.
The first challenge is the alleged lack of funds, relative 
to the unprecedented scale of destruction in the region. 
Indeed, reconstruction will likely take place in difficult 
economic times because of low international oil prices. 
Since the end of the second World War, the MENA 
region has come to occupy a specific position in the 
global division of labour, depending almost completely 
on the production and exportation of crude energy. 
Energy-related resources will be unsurprisingly crucial 
for reconstruction, which may be funded by national 
governments in oil-rich countries like Iraq and Libya or 
through intra-regional transfers, as may be the case in 
Syria (or was in post-1990 Lebanon). The 2014 decline 
in oil prices has hampered the financial capacities of 
many of the region’s governments, especially those oil-
rich that have traditionally and historically used their 
financial superiority to finance both conflict and peace-
building (for example, post-1990 Lebanon). The recent 
slump has projected large deficits, raised pressures on 
precious reserves from boon times, and even pushed 
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some countries, such as Libya5 and Iraq6, into heavy 
foreign debt. If the slump that started in 2014 proves to be 
structural and enduring, this may cause severe constraints 
on resource availability and hence on governments’ room 
for manoeuvre, as well as the maneuverability of their 
regional allies. The absence of sufficient resources may 
exacerbate distributional conflicts. 
Financing post-war stabilisation-cum-reconstruction 
is a political process par excellence, which requires the 
governmental and/or inter-governmental transfusion of 
funds. It cannot be replaced by market actors pursuing 
profits due to the high-risk involved and the weak 
economic status of post-war countries. The process 
requires national or international parties to foot the bill 
for corporations, or guarantee credit repayment to banks 
and investment funds. This is one of the reasons why, 
in the case of Syria, it is unlikely that Chinese or Indian 
investors, creditors or developers motivated purely by a 
market rationale, will step forward, at least not fully. Who 
will eventually pay, in the absence of their governments’ 
clear political stakes and Russia’s and Iran’s weak financial 
capacities to finance a full-blown reconstruction of 
Syria? Syria does not even have sizable natural- resource 
reserves (i.e. oil and gas) that it can use to secure long-
term debt, as with Angola and China for example. 
The second challenge is less tangible but by no means 
less critical. It regards the political and institutional 
frameworks that are likely to govern how reconstruction 
may take place. This is almost wholly decided by the way 
in which the conflict is concluded, whether by a party’s 
victory over the others or by a political settlement, or 
a combination of both. The first scenario seems to be 
the fate awaiting Syria, where reconstruction will likely 
be interwoven with the re-institution of the regime’s 
authority. The second may better reflect Libya’s case, given 
the balance of weakness between the different parties, 
whereas Iraq will likely be some form of settlement 
following insurgency defeat. 
Regardless of the sources and funds available, 
reconstruction is likely to benefit some countries more 
than others. With a lack of robust national institutions, 
5.  See, for instance: Libya Government Debt to GDP at 
https://tradingeconomics.com/libya/government-debt-to-
gdp
6.  See, for instance: Iraq Government Debt to GDP at https://
tradingeconomics.com/iraq/government-debt-to-gdp
whatever funds exist may be eaten up by corruption and 
narrowly-formed coalitions of cronies and clients, which 
is typical in post-war contexts. A case in point is Iraq’s 
failed first reconstruction following the 2003 US-led 
invasion. This could occur with any reconstruction, 
not only in Iraq, but also in Libya where oil creates easy 
rents that are captured by those in power at the expense 
of a weakly organised and voiceless populous. This has 
proved to be quite dangerous, exacerbating the sense of 
exclusion and grievance on regional and sectarian basis 
in North-Western provinces, which ISIS later overran. 
Corruption and deterioration in public services also 
constituted the subject of popular mobilisations in Basra 
and Kurdistan. In many instances, they exposed crises of 
legitimacy and accountability for elected party elites over 
the use of oil money. 
Dampening the situation further, a heavy international 
presence in Iraq since 2003 has not curbed the self-
serving attitudes of politicians and bureaucrats, nor 
disrupted patronage networks. As a matter of fact, there is 
ample evidence that foreign investors (in the oil industry 
and in infrastructure) have thrived by capitalising on 
weak national institutions to the detriment of the host 
countries. There is reason to believe that this could 
almost definitely be the case in Libya where any potential 
reconstruction would imply an outward flow of oil 
rents to multinational construction companies with no 
regard whatsoever to accountability, transparency or the 
political impact of business deals.
This could be the fate of any international transfers 
for Syria’s reconstruction, as regime-cronies and the 
networks of clients they stand for would claim whatever 
funds they could in order to swell their ranks, reward loyal 
regions and groups, and to punish others. The scope and 
scale of reconstruction may even serve as a tool for social 
engineering with clear implications for the sectarian and 
ethnic composition of areas of the country that witnessed 
the mass exodus of refugees. Yet, the regime may choose 
to give economic concessions to losers in the civil war by 
reconstructing homes and public utilities as a substitute 
for any political concessions (e.g. power sharing or 
re-forming of the political system). This was the case for 
instance in Sri Lanka following the defeat of the Tamil 
rebellion to the North.  
The political economy of reconstruction will be decided 
by the outcome of the ongoing conflicts and how they are 
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likely to conclude. Meanwhile, what can an international 
actor like the European Union (EU) do in the light of all 
the internal and external limitations on its role?
The EU’s priority as an actor is to do no harm. Under 
no circumstance should Europeans accept a situation 
in which they would pump money into patronage and 
corrupt networks that serve the few at the expense of 
the many. This is especially the case in any post-war 
Syria where an EU role as a funder for reconstruction 
will undoubtedly be needed and on a large scale. The 
US is turning inward under the Trump administration. 
Russia and Iran, the regime’s two astounding allies, are 
unlikely to afford any meaningful transfers amid low 
oil prices and domestic pressures for better standards of 
living (i.e. Iran’s recent commotion). Meanwhile, none of 
the Persian Gulf countries would invest in a Syria where 
they lost to their rivals. Given all this, the EU should not 
contend with financing the reconstruction of the Syrian 
regime rather than Syria itself, under any illusive pretext 
of stability or development. This will not deliver in the 
absence of some accommodating settlement, politically 
or at least economically (e.g. financing projects in regions 
that rebelled against the regime). 
The EU shall then most probably end up sustaining 
a minimal flow of aid to refugees and the internally 
displaced. It should explicitly condition any increase 
in funds with observing clear accountability and 
transparency standards together with mechanisms for 
local community representation, especially with regard 
to utilities and infrastructure projects. It may then be that 
Europeans can carve a role for themselves in the local 
details of a post-war settlement using their power of the 
purse.  
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